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formulated: (i) a Benchmark scenario, with demographic rates kept constant at their 
1980-84 level; (ii) a Fertility scenario, with a rise of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
towards replacement level; (iii) a Mortality scenario, with reductions in mortality rates 
of 30 percent for females, and 45 percent for males; (iv) a Western scenario, which 
combines extreme demographic conditions of several West European countries: a TFR 
of 1.28, proportions never-marrying of one-third, one-third of marriages ending in divorce, 
and male and female life expectancies of 74 and 81 years, respectively. 
The current pension system was combined with all four scenarios. Also, the impact of 
high female labor force participation, and a rise in the average age at retirement were 
investigated. The results indicate that changes in demographic conditions cannot prevent 
increases in and funding problems for pension expenditures in Finland. An increase in 
fertility has no effect on the pension system until 2030, when a larger generation will 
enter the labor force. Longer active periods for males and females will cause increases 
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problem. Postponement of retirement age would help to balance the pension funds, but 
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DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS AND THE PENSION 
PROBLEM IN FINLAND 
The Population Research Institute 
Helsinki, Finland 
1. Population Trends in Modern Finland 
In conformity with developments in Europe, the population of Finland increased rapidly 
after the end of the 18th century. In 1850 there were 1.6 million inhabitants in Finland. 
From 1850 to 1920 the population had almost doubled. Not until the end of the 1920s 
did growth weaken. The augmentation was mainly caused by a decrease in mortality. 
World War 11 turned population developments in an entirely new direction. Immediately 
after the war fertility rose. In the mid-1950s it started to decline again and continued to 
decline during the following decades. Towards the end of the 1970s fertility stabilized and 
has remained more or less on the same level. Life expectancy has increased steadily. 
After the Second World War internal migration became intensive and reached its peak 
in the mid-1970s. Emigration has been a significant social phenomenon on two occasions 
during the last hundred years: before the First World War and after the Second World 
War. Net emigration after the Second World War has been about six percent of the 
population. 
In the first decade of the 20th century fertility started to decline quite distinctly. 
Principally this declining tendency continued until the middle of the 1970s. In 1901-1910 
total fertility was 4.7 children per woman. In the 1930s it went down to 2.4. During the 
time of the baby-boom (1946-1950) it increased to 3.4. When the bottom was reached in 
1973, it was only 1.5. In the mid-1970s it was on a level of about 1.7, where it has 
remained. In Figure 1 the annual total fertility rate from 1950 to 1987 is displayed. 
Even though the real fertility period has become shorter and shorter, over the last few 
years there has been a tendency to have children at a later age, as shown by the median 
age at first child. From 1970 to 1985 it rose from 23.2 to 25.7. 
A characteristic feature of the fertility pattern during the last decades has been the 
growing proportion of children born out of wedlock. In 1970 only 5.8 percent of all live 
births occurred out of wedlock. Gradually, the proportion of extramarital births started 
to go up: in 1980 it was 13.1 percent and in 1986 as high as 18.0 percent (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Total period fertility rate per woman, 1950-1987. Source: Yearbook 1982,1986; 
OSF VI A:139, p. 40. 
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Figure 2. Children born out of wedlock in 1950-1986, percent of live births. Source: CSO 
Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1966, 1977 and 1990. 
Even though premarital relationships have been relatively common in Finland, the reason 
for the increasing proportion of children born out of wedlock is increasing cohabitation 
without marriage. The number of childless families has increased somewhat since 1970. 
With industrialization and accompanying urbanization, great changes have occurred in 
the marriage and divorce patterns and an increasingly smaller .proportion of the 
population has remained unmarried. Since the beginning of the 1970s new features have 
become clearly evident. The age at marriage has risen more for men than for women. 
Living in a consensual union has become more common among the young. 
The crude marriage rate, which was rather high immediately after the Second World 
War, was still 8.5 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1950 (Table 1). During the 1950s it went down 
and was 7.2 at the end of the decade. When the large age groups born after the war 
reached marriageable age, it increased again. The peak was reached in 1967. Since then 
it has decreased continuously. 
Table 1. Crude marriage rate, median age at first marriage and crude divorce rate, 
1950-1988. Source: CSO Statistical Yearbook of Finland 1989; OSF VI A:106, pp. 
112-153; Yearbook 1989. 
Marriage rate Median age at first marriage Divorce rate 
Males Females 
1950 8.5 25.1 23.5 0.92 
1960 7.4 24.4 22.7 0.83 
1970 8.8 23.5 22.3 1.31 
1980 6.1 25.6 24.1 1.98 
1985 5.3 26.4 24.4 1.85 
1988 5.0' 27.0 25.2 2.93' 
From the beginning of the century to the mid-1930s the median age at first marriage 
remained practically unchanged. The five-year average varied between 26.1 to 27.1 for 
men and between 23.5 to 24.4 for women. During and after the Second World War the 
median age showed a decreasing tendency. In 1950 it was 23.5 for women and 25.1 for 
men (Table 1). Early marriage became rather common after the war. Teenage marriages 
rose very distinctly. In 1955-1960 almost one-quarter of the brides in rural areas were 
under 20 years of age, while the proportion before the war was only about 12 percent. 
The rise was distinct also among urban females, although not as high as among rural 
brides. 
The later age at marriage during the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s obviously was 
to a large degree fictitious, even though continuously prolonged education and vocational 
training have contributed to the postponement of contracting marriage. Young people 
moved in together more or less at the same age as before, but now more and more often 
without marriage. 
In 1987 about 15 percent of all conjugal unions--marriages and consensual unions--were 
consensual unions. Among 15-24 year-olds still more than 80 percent are neither married 
nor living in consensual unions, but in these age groups about two-thirds of all unions are 
consensual (CSO 1989a). In the following age group, 25-29 years of age, 33 percent were 
consensual unions. The number of consensual unions decreases with age, e.g. among 
persons 45-64 years of age living with a partner only 10 percent were living in a 
consensual union. There is no information on the proportions among those over 65 years 
of age, but obviously it is still lower. Most of the consensual unions end in marriage. In 
1987 20 percent of men and 14 percent of women living in consensual unions were 
divorced. This means that there are half as many divorced individuals living in consensual 
unions as those having remarried. 
At the beginning of the 20th century about 40 percent of men and women were 
unmarried, women somewhat less than men. During the following decades the proportion 
of unmarried grew and reached its peak in the 1930s. The following decade, marked by 
the Second World War, was characterized by a marriage boom, and the proportion of 
unmarried went down and was smallest in the 1960s. After that there has again been a 
trend towards more unmarried persons, which reflects the increase of consensual unions. 
The largest changes in the nuptiality pattern have occurred in the frequency of divorce. 
In Finland as in many other European countries the divorce rate started to increase in 
the mid-1960s. After a small peak at the end of the 1940s caused by marriages contracted 
during the war, the crude divorce rate remained more or less unchanged until the end 
of the 1950s. Growth was rather modest in the 1960s, but it rose rapidly in the beginning 
of the 1970s. For rather a long time the crude divorce rate remained stable at a good two 
divorces per year per 1,000 inhabitants and year (Table 1). 
The highest proportion of divorced is to be found in age groups 30-49, where the 
proportion is somewhat higher among men than among women. In the age group 35-39 
the proportion is highest; in 1985 it was 18.5 percent among men and 15.6 among women. 
Among women aged 65 the proportion of divorced is twice as high as among men, even 
if the proportion is low, about 2-6 percent. 
Among those who married in 1950 in Finland, 18 percent were divorced 30 years later. 
The same level has been reached much earlier by later marriage cohorts. Those who 
married in 1970 show the same proportion 13 years later. There has been a strong 
increase in divorce especially during the first years of marriage. Many a marital lifestyle 
continues after a period of varying length after the divorce, but with another partner, 
either in the form of a new marriage or a consensual union. Nowadays a remarriage is 
almost always preceded by a divorce. One hundred years ago, at the end of the 1880s, 
remarriage in Finland composed about 20 percent of all marriages being contracted, but 
almost all remarriages were contracted by partners of which at least one was widowed 
(OSF 1909 VI:41). In the mid-1980s, the proportion of remarriages was 22 percent (OSF 
VI A:152), of which only two percentage units represented marriages where one partner 
had been widowed. 
If one assumes that the remarriage pattern over the last few years was the same as in 
1984, one reaches the conclusion that after ten years, among males 35 percent and among 
females 32 percent contract a new marriage. During the following ten years the 
proportion of remarriages increases but at a much slower rate. Twenty years after the 
divorce 47 percent of the men and 43 percent of the women will be remarried. 
A significant share of the divorced live in consensual unions. According to the annual 
labor force survey (OSF 1985 XL: 11, I), 11 percent of all men and women living in a 
conjugal union lived together in a consensual union in 1984. Of these 17 percent were 
divorced men and 21 percent divorced women. A s iwcant ly  larger proportion of 
divorced persons are living in a consensual union than of the entire population. 
After the Second World War mortality declined rapidly. The crude death rate fell from 
about 12 per thousand in 1946 to roughly 9 in 1952 and approximately 10 in 1989. The 
mean expectation of life at birth went up from 58.6 in 1946-50 to 65.9 in 1956-60 among 
men and from 65.8 to 71.6 among women (Table 2). In the 1960s, male life expectancy 
rose only slightly but during the two following decades the development was again 
favorable. Among females the trend was the same but not so accentuated as among 
males. 
Table 2. Life expectancy at birth and at age 60 and survivors at age 80 per 1000 
newborn, 1950-1987. Source: CSO VA 1974:13; OSF VI A:147; CSO 1980. 
Life expectancy 
At birth At age 60 
Males Females Males Females 
1950 60.5 67.7 13.8 16.6' 
1960 65.1 72.1 14.4 17.5~ 
1970 65.9 74.2 14.3 16.5 
1980 69.2 77.8 15.7 20.9 
1985 70.1 78.5 16.1 21.3 
1987 70.7 78.7 16.7 21.7 
Survivors 
Males Females 
150 285 
187 341 
189 395 
255 527 
274 546 
299 557 
The mean of the five-year periods 1946-1950 and 1951-1955. 
The mean of the five-year periods 1956-1960 and 1%1-1%5. 
During the 1970s mortality declined among both men and women in all age groups. The 
decline was most rapid (about 50 percent) among children under 10 years of age. Among 
females the decline was, in general, greater than among males. The decline was very 
small among men aged 20-29, which was mainly due to an increase in mortality from 
suicide. The age-standardized mortality of men aged 35-64 rose eight percent from 1959 
to 1969, but declined 25 percent from 1969 to 1980, which means that the decrease was 
faster than among women. The declining trend in female mortality has, on the other 
hand, been more stable. 
The decline in mortality has been most significant in later age groups. During the last few 
decades the life expectancy of the elderly population, especially of women, has increased 
rapidly. In 1987 the expectation of life at age 60 was 21.7 for women and 16.7 for men. 
In the beginning of the 1960s the figures were 16.8 and 13.8, respectively (Table 2). 
Proportionally the increase of life expectancy has been greater among still older persons. 
At the age of 80 life expectancy has increased from the beginning of the 1950s to 1987 
from 4.9 to 6.1 among men and from 5.4 to 7.6 among women. In 1950 there were 150 
male survivors at age 80 of one thousand newborn boys. In 1987 the number was twice 
as high. As to females the figures were 285 and 557, respectively. The male survivors had 
grown somewhat more than female survivors. 
Infant mortality, which was still considerably high in the beginning of the 1950s, higher 
e.g. than in Sweden and Norway, showed the same rapid decrease as mortality in general 
in the 1950s. In the 1960s it was already among the lowest in the world. The decreasing 
tendency continued, and in 1986 it was 6.4. 
In contrast to very low infant mortality, excess male mortality has been notably high. At 
the beginning of this century the male-female mortality difference was almost zero, but 
it increased considerably up until the 1970s, when the difference in longevity was about 
nine years. After that a small decline could be observed, and in the most recent years 
(1987) the difference has shrunk by about one year. The reasons behind the high male 
death rates are still greatly a matter for conjecture. It seems likely, however, that smoking 
has been one of the causes of the early increase of male mortality. There is also clear 
excess mortality from violent causes of death. Further, mortality from cardiovascular 
diseases is among the highest in the world and the suicide rate unacceptably high. 
2. Population Size and Age Structure in IIASA Scenarios 
In order to trace the consequences for social security of future population trends in 
Finland, four demographic scenarios were set up for the period 1985-2050. 
1. The Benchmark scenario, with age-specific rates for fertility, mortality, marriage and 
marriage dissolution constant at the levels observed during 1980-1984 in Finland. 
2. The Fertility scenario in which it is assumed that fertility in Finland will gradually 
increase from its 1980-1984 level of 1.69 children per woman to replacement level 
(TFR = 2.1) in the period 2000-2004. 
3. The Mortality scenario, with a gradual decrease by 30 percent of female mortality 
rates, and one by 45 percent of the rates for males. It is equivalent to an increase 
of 8.4 years in the life expectancy of males, and about 4.8 years for females. Thus 
the existing nine-year gap between male and female life expectancy would be 
reduced to approximately five years. 
4. The Western low scenario, which combines the most extreme demographic conditions 
presently observed in Western Europe: a TFR of 1.28 (6. the FRG), proportions 
never-marrying of one-third (6. Sweden), one-third of all marriages ending in 
divorce (Sweden), and life expectancies of 74 and 81 years for men and women, 
respectively (Switzerland). 
In all the scenarios made at IIASA the population size will be smaller in 2050 than in 
1985. In the beginning of the period there is a population increase which varies in 
different scenarios. The decrease starts at different times, but in all scenarios the 
decrease is a fact in 2030. The highest population size will be reached if fertility is on the 
replacement level, and the lowest if fertility is as low as it was in the former FRG and 
the marriage and divorce rates as low as those in Sweden. 
Several population projections and scenarios have been made in Finland during the last 
years. Every second year the Statistical Office produces a population projection which is 
based on population trends prevailing during the last years. It could be considered as the 
most realistic estimate of the demographic development in the near future. Unfortunately, 
it extends only to the beginning of the next century; the latest one goes to 2010. During 
the last years the Social Insurance Institution has published a projection as often as the 
Statistical Office. This covers a period much longer than that of the Statistical Office; the 
latest one goes to 2050. Principally, the two sets of projections are based on exactly the 
same assumptions. 
Several scenarios have been made by authorities working with societal planning such as 
social policy, labor force, housing policy, etc. In the following, however, when discussing 
the consequences of population trends, comparisons will be made between IIASA and 
Finnish scenarios. 
In the benchmark scenario in which the population development is a continuation of the 
situation at the beginning of the 1980s, there will be a small increase until the beginning 
of the 2000s (Table 3). After that a decrease will start and gradually accelerate. In 2050 
the population size is about three-fourths of what it is in 2000, or 3.9 million. It is 
interesting to compare the benchmark scenario with the latest population projection 
made in Finland (The Social Insurance Institution 1990). In this projection it is assumed 
that age-specific fertility rates will be the same as in 1989 for the whole period or 
practically the same as in 1980-1985. Life expectancy will increase for males from 71.5 
to 74 years and for females from 79.5 to 81 from 1990 to 2010. After that life expectancy 
will remain on the level achieved. No net in- or outmigration is assumed. The projection 
could be considered to give a fairly good estimation of the real population trend without 
migration, at least for the nearest decades. According to the projection the total 
population will be 4.98 million in 2015, 4.66 million in 2030 and 4.02 million in 2050. 
Hence, the figures estimated in the projection are higher than those in the benchmark 
scenario in almost all years shown. 
If fertility returns to replacement level or the total fertility rate is 2.1 from the beginning 
of the scenario period, the increase is somewhat greater and will last longer than in the 
benchmark scenario. In the fertility scenario the population size is as high as 5.1 million 
in 2015 but diminishes to 4.8 million in 2050. 
In the third scenario which assumes that mortality will decrease by 30 percent for women 
and 45 percent for men, i.e. an increase of life expectancy of 8-10 years for men and 4-5 
years for women, the increase by 2015 is slightly higher than in the fertility scenario. The 
size of the population will, however, be much lower in 2050 or only 4.3 million. 
The last scenario, the Western European scenario combines the most extreme 
demographic rates observed at present in Western Europe, i.e. (a) low fertility as in the 
former FRG, 1.28 children per woman, (b) the Swedish marriage and divorce rate, 
one-third never married, one-third of all marriages ending in divorce, mean age at first 
marriage for women 28 years and for men 30 years, (c) Swiss mortality, life expectation 
for men 74 years and for women 81 years. This scenario shows the most pronounced 
decrease. The population size in 2050 is only 3.3 million. 
Table 3. Population by broad age groups, 1950-2050. 
Number (1000) % 
0-14 15-59 60+ Total 0-14 15-59 60+ Total 
Benchmark Scenario 
High Fertility Scenario 
Low Mortality Scenario 
Western Scenario 
Typical for all scenarios is that the number and proportion of the elderly population 
increases while the same figures for children, except in the high fertility scenario, 
decrease. The number of the elderly population grew less toward the end of the period 
in all scenarios, while their proportion increased during the whole period. The diminution 
of the child-age population is most marked in the Western European scenario, where the 
number of children is only one-third of what it was in the beginning of the period. 
In the benchmark scenario the proportion of the elderly population reaches 28 percent 
in 2030, and in 2050 it is still on the same level. At the same time the proportion of the 
child-age population decreases to 16 percent. In the low mortality scenario the figures are 
much higher for the elderly population, or 34.5 percent, and only insignificantly lower for 
the child-age population, or 14 percent. The Western European scenario shows the most 
radical changes. Only 10 percent of the population are under 15 years of age and 38 
percent are 65 years or older. The smallest changes are exhibited in the high fertility 
scenario with 20 percent children and 23 percent aged 65 or more. 
Of great interest is the development of the working-age population. In all scenarios the 
decrease is rather remarkable. The change is less in the high fertility, scenario and most 
notable in the Western European scenario. On the other hand, even if the number goes 
down the proportion will only show a rather modest decline. 
Numerically the working-age population will decrease from 3.1 million in 1985 to 2.2 in 
the benchmark and the low mortality scenarios, and to 1.7 million in the Western 
European scenario. If fertility returns to reproduction level the decrease is rather low. In 
2050 there will be 2.7 million persons of working age. The changes in the proportion are 
much smaller. In the benchmark and high fertility scenarios it lessens from 63 percent in 
1985 to 56 and 57 percent, respectively. In the low mortality scenario the proportion 
decreases to 51 percent, and this is also the case in the Western European scenario. 
The old-age dependency rate will increase noticeably during the period (Table 4). In 1985 
there were only 18 persons aged 65 or over per 100 persons in working age. According 
to the benchmark scenario, it will rise to 35 in 2030 and remain, on the whole, at this 
level until the end of the period. In the high fertility scenario the growth is almost of the 
same rate at the beginning of the 2000s, but at the end of the period the effects of the 
higher fertility will be visible and in 2050 the ratio will be 28 per 100. In the low 
mortality and Western European scenario the old-age dependency rate increases to about 
50 per 100. The total dependency rate (children and elderly compared with those in 
working age) grows from 47 to 60 per 100 in the benchmark and high fertility scenarios 
and to around 70 per 100 in the two other scenarios. 
Table 4. Dependency ratios, 1985-2050. 
Benchmark 28.5 26.1 24.6 25.0 24.8 
High Fertility 27.6 29.6 31.2 31.9 
Low Mortality 26.0 24.2 24.6 24.4 
Western 24.5 19.3 18.7 17.5 
Benchmark 18.4 
High Fertility 
Low Mortality 
Western 
Benchmark 46.9 
High Fertility 
Low Mortality 
Western 
3. Marital Composition of the Elderly Population 
The scenarios show rather significant changes in marital status composition of those aged 
60 or over during the following decades (Table 5). In all scenarios the proportion of the 
single and divorced will grow and the proportion of the married will decline. Even the 
widowed will be proportionally fewer in all scenarios. The change is, however, rather 
small. The trends in all scenarios are the same for men and women, except for the low 
mortality scenario, where the widowed men show an increasing tendency. As a 
consequence of the difference in life expectancy between men and women, but also partly 
as a result of war losses, the proportion of married men was almost twice as great as that 
of women in 1985. There is also a great difference between the proportion of widowed 
females and widowed males; while 44 percent of the females in 1985 were widowed, only 
13 percent of males had the same marital status. 
In the benchmark scenario the proportion single increases more among men than among 
women. In 2050 there will be 20 percent single females but 27 percent single males. The 
changes among the married exhibit the same rate. In 2050 the proportion of the married 
men will still be almost twice as great as that of women. The proportion divorced rate 
will increase rapidly in the beginning of the following century, but will show a decreasing 
tendency during the last decades of the period studied. 
The other scenarios present more or less similar changes. The highest proportion of the 
single of both sexes is exhibited in the Western European scenario. The lowest proportion 
of females divorced and widowed could also be noted in the Western European scenario. 
The highest proportion of married women and divorced men in 2050 are exhibited in the 
low mortality scenario. 
The increasing life expectancy for men has a great impact on the future marital 
composition among old-age people. In the benchmark scenario--and in the high fertility 
scenario--the sex ratio grows from 60 to 67 during the period studied (Table 6). Both 
scenarios show the trends under present mortality conditions. Evidently, the period 
studied has been too short to allow the higher fertility to affect the sex ratio among the 
old-age population. 
The effect of the increasing male life expectancy in relation to that of female is most 
accentuated in the low mortality scenario, where the sex ratio grows very rapidly at the 
beginning of the 2000s. From 2015 to 2050 the increase is rather small or from 81.8 to 
85.2. It is significant also in the Western European scenario, even if not so rapid. 
It is to be remembered that the scenarios show the marital status composition. There are 
couples living in consensual unions also among the elderly, which in practice means that 
they live under similar conditions as married couples. There is at present no information 
on the proportions among those over 65 years of age; it is obviously rather low--only a 
few percent of all unions. In the future, assumably the proportion will be higher if the 
increase of consensual unions continues at the same rate as at present. The consequence 
is that in reality the number and the proportion of persons living alone might be 
progressively lower than the number and proportion of non-married persons according 
to the scenarios. 
Table 5. 
Females 
1985 
Marital composition of population aged 60 or over, 1985-2050. 
Single Married Divorced Widowed Total 
Benchmark Scenario 
Low Mortality Scenario 
Western Scenario 
Males 
1985 8.5 
Benchmark Scenario 
Low Mortality Scenario 
Western Scenario 
Table 6. Sex ratios (men/100 women) for the population aged 60 and over, 1985-2050. 
Benchmark H i g h F e r t i l i t y  LowMortality Western 
4. The Finnish Pension Systems 
The Finnish pension system is composed of an employment pension scheme and a 
national pension scheme. The private and public sectors have their own employment 
pensions. 
The national pension's task is to guarantee a certain minimum income for all pensioners. 
It comprises a small basic amount and an additional amount, which is reduced by the 
employment pension. All pensioners receive the basic amount, which is the same for 
everybody. The additional amount includes various supplements depending on marital 
status, family circumstances, etc. The national pension contribution is taken from the 
income tax of employees. 
Before the enactment of the Employment Pensions Act in 1962, the national pension 
provided a minimum income for the majority of pensioners. Later, as the employment 
pension gradually increased, the national pension lost some of its significance and the 
trend is toward still less significance. For instance, when a male industrial worker 
receiving an average income retires, he will only receive the basic amount in addition to 
his employment pension. 
The employment pensions are determined by earnings during a period of employment 
and the length of the insurance period. A full pension in the private sector is 60 percent 
of the wage after a 40-year period of employment. The amount of the pension is 1.5 
percent of the pensionable earnings for every year of employment. In the public sector 
the full pension is 66 percent of the wage and it accrues after 30 years of service, or 2.2 
percent for every year of employment. As the pension scheme in the private sector is 
implemented in stages, the full amount of 60 percent will be attainable at the turn of the 
century. At present the minimum level for old-age pension is 39 percent for employees 
and 38 percent for self-employed persons. 
The private-sector employment pensions are implemented by several acts such as the 
Employees' Pensions Act, the Self-Employed Persons'. Pensions Act, the Farmers' 
Pensions Act, etc. On the whole, the various pension acts are similar. 
Private employment pension insurance is financed by two alternative systems, a 
pay-as-you-go system and a funding system. Farmers' and self-employed persons' pensions 
are based on a pay-as-you-go system, while for instance the most important pension 
system, the employees' pension system, is partly financed by funding, partly by a 
pay-as-you-go system. Employers are entirely responsible for financing the employees' 
pensions. State pensions are financed out of the state budget and local government 
pensions out of local government budgets. Hence, state and local government pensions 
are based entirely on the pay-as-you-go system. From 1990 on, however, the local 
government pension system will be partly based on funding. Totally, about 40 percent of 
the pension costs in 1985 were paid purely from pay-as-you-go pension systems. 
In 1985 the contribution paid by the employers was on average 11-12 percent of the 
employees' wages. The pension costs in 1985 were 11 percent of the GDP and 43 percent 
of the total social expenditure (Economic Planning Center 1986, p. 47). 
Pension benefit levels are adjusted every year by an index which is calculated from the 
average changes in the price index and the general wage index. 
5. Retirement and Work Pattern 
The general pensionable age is 65. In the public sector the pensionable age is 63 or 
lower. In 1986 a flexible retirement age was introduced in the private sector and some 
years later also in the public sector; an early old-age pension could be granted starting 
from the age of 60. The pension can also be postponed beyond 65. Early retirement 
reduces the amount of the pension. An employee or a self-employed person, who has 
reached 55 years of age, can receive an early disability pension, which is a moderate 
version of the disability pension. A person whose work capacity has been so reduced that 
he or she cannot be expected to continue his or her work, is entitled to this kind of 
pension. Factors affecting the granting of an early disability pension are illness, disability, 
work-related stress and fatigue and working conditions. Persons aged 60-64 who have 
received an unemployment benefit for 220 days are entitled to an unemployment pension. 
Both pensions, which could be considered forms of early retirement, are equal to the full 
pension to which a person is entitled. 
Before July 1990 all widows were entitled to a survivor's pension. The rules were 
somewhat different for survivors with or without children. The size of the survivor's 
pension varied depending on the number of beneficiaries, with one-half pension for one 
beneficiary. After July 1990 a new survivor's pension act changed the rules for receiving 
survivor's pensions. For example, the survivor's pension depends on the income of the 
survivor. 
In reality, the retirement age is much lower than the official one. Already in 1985 about 
56 percent of the population aged 60-64 years and 34 percent of those aged 55-59 had 
a disability, unemployment or old-age pension. Since then more and more people have 
made use of their right to early retirement. In 1988 about 55 percent of the population 
aged 55-64 received some kind of pension, under disability, unemployment, old age, 
front-veterans' or farmers" pension schemes. Of those aged 55, 24 percent had retired. 
The proportion increases with age, and 84 percent of those aged 64 were retirees (Hytti 
h a t  is, pension paid to farmers aged 55-64 on a transfer of the farm to a descendant or to 
farmers aged 55-64 who voluntarily give up unprofitable farms. 
et al. 1990). The proportion was somewhat smaller among women than among men. For 
instance, while 88 percent of the men aged 64 were retired, the corresponding figure for 
women was only 81 percent. Hence, the mean age at retirement of both sexes together 
was 60 years. 
A cross section of the current old-age retirement pattern is given in the statistics on new 
retirees in 1989, when early retirement became possible also in the public sector. Figure 
3 shows the new retirees under old-age retirement and early disability pension schemes, 
which in many regards could be juxtaposed with the early retirement pension. Both 
schemes are in force from 55 years of age. Hence, the figures give a picture of the real 
old-age retirement pattern. It can be seen that the greatest part of retirements still occur 
at the age of 65. Only about one-third of all retirees have used the possibility to retire 
earlier than 65. The mean age at old-age retirement is 60.7 for men and 63.0 for women. 
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Figure 3. New old-age retirees by age and sex in 1989. Source: The Central Pension 
Security Institute 1989; Unpublished data on new retirees in the public sector from the 
Pension Institute of the Municipalities and State 1989. 
There is a rather significant difference between the average number of years worked at 
mean age at retirement. In 1985 it was 42.1 years for males and only 29.1 for females 
(Table 7). As a consequence of the changes in the sex and age pattern in economic 
activity during the last decades, the average number of years worked will be reduced to 
37.5 for males in 2050 and increased for females to 35.6 when the age-specific labor force 
participation rates of 1985 are kept constant. 
Table 7. Average number of years worked at mean age at retirement, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Males 42.1 40.5 38.5 37.8 37.5 
Females 29.1 32.4 35.4 35.5 35.6 
6. The Future of State Pensions 
6.1. Pension expenditures 
All scenarios mainly follow the same pattern; the pension expenditures will increase 
rather little in the beginning of the period studied. In the first decade of the next century 
growth will continue at a higher rate. During the last decades of the period studied, the 
expenditure curve will change direction and even become negative, so that the total 
amount will be lower in 2050 than in 2030. 
The pension expenditures under prevailing circumstances show only a small increase 
during the last decade of this century (Table 8). The growth will cumulate in the 
beginning of the next century. During the period 2000-2015 the annual increase will be 
1.4 percent. After that the growth rate will become negative during the next 15-year 
period. If the index of the total expenditures is 100 in 1985, it will rise to 153 in 2030 but 
will be only 132 in 2050. 
It should be mentioned that according to the calculations made by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health (1987b, p. 25) the total cost of pensions, including old-age, disability 
and survivor's pensions, will grow in the basic alternative from 39 billion in 1987 to 58 
billion Finnish marks in 2000 and 134 billion in 2030. The annual growth of real income 
is assumed to be 1.5 percent and benefits are assumed to grow at the same rate as real 
income. The number of beneficiaries of employment pension will be 76 percent more 
in 2030 than in 1987; 58 percent of the growth of pension cost are caused by an 
increasing number of pensions and 42 percent of the income growth. 
Further, it is assumed that fertility will be the same as in 1985 and life expectancy will 
increase to 73.4 for men and 80 for women in 2000 and remain on this level to 2030. No 
immigration or emigration is included in the calculation. 
It has not been possible to explain satisfactorily the great difference between the Finnish 
calculation and the benchmark scenario. The income growth included in the Finnish 
calculation but not in the IIASA scenarios partly explains it. However, if the economic 
growth is eliminated the Finnish estimate is still about hundred percent greater. Another 
reason for the difference is the number of beneficiaries--old-age and disability pension 
receivers as well as survivors--which is estimated to be in 2030 about 24 percent greater 
than in the benchmark scenario. The beneficiaries of the national pension system which 
does not depend on employment and which is paid to those without or with a reduced 
employment pension are estimated at 1,137,000 and those receiving employment pensions 
at 1,168,000 (old-age and disability pension). 
T a b l e  8. P e n s i o n  e x p e n d i t u r e s .  1985-2050 
S c e n a r i o  1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
A b s o l u t e  ( m i l l i o n s  o f  F i n n i s h  marks)  
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
i n d e x  (1985=100) 
Benchmark o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
Low M o r t a l i t y  o l d  a g e  
s ~ r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
High F e r t i l i t y  o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
Western o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
P e r c e n t a g e  
Benchmark o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
Low M o r t a l i t y  o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
High F e r t i l i t y  o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
Western o l d  a g e  
s u r v i v o r s  
t o t a l  
Benchmark o l d  a g e  100 117 146 157 135 
s u r v i v o r s  100 112 123 127 109 
t o t a l  100 116 14 3 153 131 
Low M o r t a l i t y  o l d  a g e  124 179 211 194 
s u r v i v o r s  111 114 119 110 
t o t a l  122 171 200 184 
High F e r t i l i t y  o l d  a g e  117 146 157 135 
s u r v i v o r s  112 123 127 109 
t o t a l  116 143 153 132 
Western o l d  a g e  121 162 182 160 
s u r v i v o r s  111 117 119 96 
t o t a l  120 157 174 152 
CI 
m 
1985100 2000/15 2015130 2030150 
Average Annual Growth R a t e  ( % )  
Benchmark o l d  a g e  1.0 1.5 0.5 -0.8 
s u r v i v o r s  0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.8 
t o t a l  1 .O 1.4 0.5 -0.8 
Low M o r t a l i t y  o l d  a g e  1 .4  2.5 1.1 -0.4 
s u r v i v o r s  0.7 0.2 0.3 -0.4 
t o t a l  1.3 2.2 1 .0 -0.4 
High F e r t i l i t y  o l d  a g e  1.0 1.5 0.5 -0.8 
s u r v i v o r s  0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.8 
t o t a l  1.0 1.4 0.5 -0.8 
Western o l d  a g e  1.3 2.0 0.8 -0.6 
s u r v i v o r s  0.7 0.3 0.1 -1.0 
t o t e 1  1.2 1.8 0.7 -0.7 
Survivor's pension based on the employment pension system will be paid to 311,000 
survivors and 36,000 will get survivor's pension from the national pension system 
(Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 1987b, p. 88). The costs are calculated separately 
for both pension systems. Because both pension systems are overlapping a comparison 
with the number of beneficiaries in the scenario is difficult. However, the national 
pension costs are in 2030 only about one-tenth of all pension costs. 
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Figure 4. Changes in total old-age and survivor benefits, 1985-2050. 
The fertility scenario follows the same pattern as the benchmark scenario. In the Western 
Europe scenario the increase will be somewhat more rapid and reach an even higher 
amount. The index for 2030 is 174 and that for 2050 as high as 152. If mortality goes 
down the pension costs will increase still more. As in the other scenarios, the increase is 
most accentuated in the period 2000-2015, with an annual growth of 2.5 percent. It will 
still be high during the following 15 years or 1.0 percent but will be negative after that. 
However, the indices for 2030 and 2050 are 200 and 184, respectively. 
The large age classes born after the Second World War, in 1947-1951, will reach pension 
age sometime in the 2010s. As the fertility curve in Finland declined continuously until 
the mid-1970s, after the baby boom in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the pension 
expenditures will decline rapidly after the large age classes begin to leave the population 
pyramid in the 2030s-2040s. 
The survivor's pensions form a rather small proportion of the total pension costs, in the 
benchmark and fertility scenarios only around one-tenth, and they will remain on this 
level during the whole period. In the two other scenarios they are even smaller (Figure 
4). Obviously, they will be smaller than calculated in the scenarios, as a new law enacted 
in 1990 curtails the possibilities of receiving a survivor's pension in the future. 
Figure 4 shows that, in all scenarios, the old-age benefits will grow most in the beginning 
of the 2000s. The period from 2030 to 2050 is a period of decrease. The changes are most 
notable for the low mortality scenario. As to the changes in survivor benefits, the pattern 
seems to be that of a continuous decrease, which is again most accentuated in the last 
part of the period studied. 
6.2. Number of retirees and the labor force 
The large age classes born after the Second World War will reach the old-age pension 
age mainly during the second decade of the next century. However, the calculated growth 
of the retirees, if the present demographic conditions prevail, is rather small during the 
first two 15-year periods (Table 9). During the third period, from 2015 to 2030, the 
growth rate will already decrease significantly and in 2050 the number of retirees will be 
less than in 2030. Proportionally the growth is greater among men than among women. 
It should be mentioned that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (1987b, p. 19) has 
calculated that in 2030 the number of beneficiaries receiving employment pension will 
be 1,168,000 assuming that fertility is the same as in 1985 and that life expectancy will 
increase to 74.3 for men and 80 for women, and remain on this level until 2030. All 
retirees receiving employment pension also receive at least the basic amount included in 
the national pension system. To these must be added those who for various reasons, e.g. 
congenital disability, do not get employment pension. Obviously, those who had an early 
old-age pension were so few in 1987 that they did not affect the number of beneficiaries, 
at least not to a notable extent. 
Table 9. Proportional change of retirees, 1985-2050. 
Old-Age Retirees 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
Low Mortality males 
females 
total 
High Fertility males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
Survivors 
Benchmark males 
females 
total 
Low Mortality males 
females 
total 
High Fertility males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
The number of those receiving national old-age pension in 2030, according to the 
calculations made by the Ministry, is 17 percent greater than the number of retirees in 
the benchmark scenario, where it was 1,003,000. However, to some extent the national 
old-age pension is paid to persons younger than 65 years of age. While the high fertility 
scenario shows almost the same development as the benchmark scenario, both the others, 
low mortality and Western European, exhibit a somewhat more intensive growth of 
retirees. 
As to the survivors, a small increase is expected during the first decades of the 2000s. At 
the end of the period studied, the number of survivors will decrease. The increase is most 
extensive, and of the same size, in the benchmark and in the high fertility scenarios. 
Labor force shows a small growth until the beginning of the next century. Under present 
conditions the decrease will be rather rapid and the rate about the same during the whole 
period. In 2050 the labor force will have shrunk to 72 percent of what it was in the 
beginning of the period (Table 10). There is no difference between sexes. In the high 
fertility scenario the change is much less. On the whole, the diminution is only about 10 
percent from 1985 to 2050. If the Western European demographic trends prevail, the 
labor force will be reduced still more, or to somewhat less than 60 percent, while the low 
mortality scenario will settle on the same level as the benchmark scenario at the end of 
the period. 
Table 10. Change of the labor force, 1985-2050 (constant activity rates). 
Benchmark males 100 102 94 8 3 7 2 
females 100 103 9 4 84 7 2 
total 100 102 94 8 4 7 2 
High Fertility males 
females 
total 
Low Mortality males 
females 
total 
Western males 
females 
total 
The overall activity rate gives an idea of the aging of the labor force. In 1985 the overall 
activity rate for males was 70.9 and for females 59.7 (Table 11). There is only a very 
small decrease until the beginning of the new century. After that it will become more 
rapid and slow down already around 2020. The decreasing trend will continue to the end 
of the period studied. There are only very small differences between the scenarios. Again 
the Western European scenario exhibits the most pronounced diminution and the high 
fertility one the smallest changes. If fertility goes up, the overall activity rates in 2050 will 
be 65.2 for men and 54.6 for women. 
Table 11. Overall activity rates, 1985-2050 (labor force as a ratio to total population aged 
15 and over). 
Males 
Benchmark 70.9 69.3 64.4 62.4 62.7 
High Fertility 69.3 64.2 62.9 65.2 
Low Mortality 68.5 61.0 56.8 55.9 
Western Europe 68.9 62.8 58.9 55.7 
Females 
Benchmark 59.7 59.1 54.7 51.6 51.4 
High Fertility 59.1 54.7 52.5 54.6 
Low Mortality 58.6 52.9 48.8 47.9 
Western Europe 58.8 53.9 49.4 45.7 
6.3. Benefits and contributions 
The ratio contribution/benefits reflects the impact of the variations in labor force on the 
pension system, primarily in a pension system based on the pay-as-you-go system. The 
ratio shows that the contributions will cover the benefits in the main, at least during this 
century, but will change significantly during the following decades. If the ratio is 100 in 
1985, it will decrease to 58 in 2030 in the benchmark scenario and remain on this level 
until the end of the period (Table 12). In the low mortality and Western European 
scenarios the decrease will be still greater, so that in 2050 the ratio will be 44 and 41, 
respectively. Again the fertility scenario is the most favorable with a diminution only to 
72. 
Table 12. Ratio contribution/benefits, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 2015 2030 2050 
Benchmark 1.06 0.94 0.70 0.58 0.59 
High Fertility 0.94 0.71 0.62 0.72 
Low Mortality 0.89 0.60 0.46 0.44 
Western Europe 0.9 1 0.64 0.48 0.4 1 
Financial equilibrium between benefits paid in the form of'pensions and contributions 
can be reached in a pay-as-you-go system either by cutting benefits or raising 
contributions. 
In the benchmark but also in the high fertility scenario a cut of 11 percent in average 
benefits would be enough to keep the benefits and contributions in balance (Table 13). 
In the other two scenarios, low mortality and western, the corresponding percentage 
would be somewhat larger. Typical for all scenarios is a rapid increase from 2000 to 2015, 
which continues somewhat more slowly during the following decades. In the high fertility 
scenario a decrease is also visible towards the end of the period. In 2050 a cut in benefits 
of about 60 percent will be necessary in the low mortality and western scenarios, in order 
to keep the financial balance between benefits and contributions. 
The balanced contribution rate in 1985 is estimated in the model to be 17.6 percent. The 
actual rate is somewhat greater, or 18.7 percent. The model shows that in order to have 
the pension fund balanced the contributions have to be increased in the benchmark 
scenario until 2030, when they are 32 percent of the gross salary. In the low mortality and 
western scenarios the contributions will have to be raised even after 2030 and will be 42 
and 46 percent, respectively, of the salaries in 2050. The lowest increase of the 
contribution rate is exhibited in the high fertility scenario, but the difference between this 
and the benchmark scenario is not noteworthy. 
Table 13. Cuts in benefits and contribution rate corresponding to a balanced pension 
fund, 1985-2050. 
Cuts in benefits ( % ) I  
Benchmark 
High fertility 
Low mortality 
Western 
Balanced contribution rateZ 
Benchmark 17.6 20.5 26.7 32.2 31.7 
High fertility 19.9 26.3 30.2 26.0 
Low mortality 21.6 31.2 40.6 42.5 
Western 20.5 29.2 39.0 45.6 
lOO*(RBC(t)/RBC(l985)-1) RBC = ratio benefits/contributions 
Actual rate(= 18.7)*RBC 
Conforming with the conclusions drawn from Table 12, the Central Pension Security 
Institute has estimated that the insurance contributions paid by the employers to the 
largest employment pension insurance (employees of private employers) has to be 
increased from 13 percent of wages to 20 percent in 2000 and to 34 percent in 2030 in 
order to cover the benefits. In 2010 the benefits will exceed the yield of insurance 
contributions. After that the funding degree will be decreased in order to balance the 
growing pension expenditures (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 1987b, p. 28). The 
assumptions concerning population and economic development are those used in the 
basic scenario in the study made by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (see pp. 
3 1-32). 
7. Impact of Increasing Participation in the Labor Force and Raising the Age of 
Ret irernen t 
An increase in the labor force participation rate will increase the financial contribution 
for pensions. The IIASA scenarios include the high activity scenario (also called "GDR 
scenario), which presumes that labor force participation by the year 2005 will be the same 
as in the former German Democratic Republic in 1985. 
Compared with the benchmark scenario, the high activity scenario shows a growth of the 
total labor force already in 2000 (see Table 14). The increase from 1985 to 2000 is about 
9 percent. During the following decades, the difference remains approximately on the 
same level. The difference is much higher in the male labor force (around 16 percent) 
than in the female labor force (less than 2 percent). This smaller increase in the female 
labor force is a consequence of the fact that the labor force participation rate of women 
is already very high in Finland (see Figure 5). 
Males and Females 
100 1 I 
Females 1 988 Males 1988 
- - - 
Females, married and unmarried 
100 
Unmarried - Married - - 
Figure 5. Labor force participation rates in 1988. Source: Ministry of Labor 1989; CSO 
1988. 
Table 14. The impact of increasing labor force participation and raising age at retirement 
on the size of the labor force, 1985-2050. 
Size of the labor force (1,000) 
Benchmark males 1338 1366 1251 1117 969 
females 1233 1265 1162 1034 892 
total 2571 2631 2413 2151 1861 
Difference with Benchmark (in % )  
males 
females 
total 
males 
females 
total 
In practice, the labor force participation could be increased rather conveniently by raising 
the age at retirement. The late retirement "65" scenario assumes that the age at 
retirement will be progressively raised to 65 years by the year 2005 for both males and 
females and that no survivors' pension will be paid under the age of 60. If the age at 
retirement is raised to 65 for both sexes, it is self-evident that the labor force 
participation of women will increase more than in the "GDR" scenario. However, the 
augmentation is not very important: in 2015 it will be about 4 percent (see Table 14). 
Again, the difference in the male labor force participation is more significant, but still 
less than in the "GDR" scenario (roughly 7 percent). The greater significance of changes 
caused by the "65" scenario for the male population is a consequence of their lower age 
at retirement in 1985 when compared to the female population. 
The increasing labor force participation in both scenarios also affects the average number 
of years worked. The rise in the "GDR" scenario in years worked at the mean age at 
retirement is again important among males. It increases from 42.1 to 44.4 years until 
2000 (see Table 15). In 2015 and later it decreases somewhat, but the difference with 
the benchmark scenario remains about 15 percent. Women's average number of years 
worked is generally significantly lower and the increase caused by the "GDR" scenario 
is not very significant. In the "65" scenario, the increase is less distinct for both sexes. 
If the labor force participation increases as in the "GDR" scenario, the number of retirees 
will also increase somewhat in the beginning of the 2000s, about three percent (Table 
16). After that it will decline. During the rest of the period studied it will be practically 
at the same level as in the benchmark scenario. The "GDR" scenario shows a growing 
number of male retirees. In 2000 there would be three percent more and in 2050 almost 
five. Female retirees will increase in the beginning of the period but already from 2015 
a small decrease compared with the benchmark scenario will be visible. 
Table 15. The impact of increasing labor force participation and raising age at retirement 
on the average number of years worked, 1985-2050. 
Benchmark males 42.1 44.4 43.9 43.3 43.2 
females 29.1 32.4 35.4 35.5 35.6 
l1 GDR" males 44.4 43.9 43.3 43.2 
females 35.2 36.3 36.4 36.4 
It6511 males 
females 
In the "65" scenario, where the age at retirement is increased to 65 in 2005, there will be 
a rather significant decrease in the number of retirees in the beginning of the period, a 
13 percent decrease in 2000. During the following decades, the difference between the 
"65" scenario and the benchmark scenario will diminish, so that it is six percent smaller 
in 2050. Again the decrease is more accentuated among men than among women. 
However, in 2050 the number of male retirees is only five percent smaller than in the 
benchmark scenario, while that of females is about nine percent less. 
Table 16. The impact of increasing labor force participation and age at retirement on 
the number of retirees compared with the benchmark scenario, 1985-2050. 
Number of retirees (1,000) 
Benchmark 
I' GDR " 
11 65 11 
Males 256 3 04 400 42 2 357 
Females 305 416 528 581 506 
Total 560 720 927 1,003 862 
Males 
Females 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Total 
Males 
Females 
Total 
Relative change ( % )  
The effects of increasing labor participation and raising the age at retirement on total 
benefits are shown in Table 17. The benefits will increase until 2030. After that a 
decreasing tendency will be visible in all scenarios. The "GDR and benchmark scenarios 
are almost of the same size for males and females. The "65" scenario shows in the 
beginning of the 2000s an 11-12 percent smaller benefit than the benchmark scenario. In 
2015, benefits are 15.5 percent smaller among males and 9.5 percent smaller among 
females. The difference decreases slightly afterwards. 
Table 17. The impact of increasing labor participation and raising the age at retirement 
on total benefits, 1985-2050. 
Total benefits (million FIM) 
Benchmark Males 9,626 11,730 15,424 16,239 13,724 
Females 13,840 15,546 18,126 19 718 17 108 
Total 23 466 27,276 33,550 35,957 30,832 
Difference with benchmark (in % )  
"GDR" Males 
Females 
Total 
1165Il Males 
Females 
Total 
The overall impact of the "GDR" and "65" scenarios could be measured by comparing the 
ratio contribution/benefits with that in the benchmark scenario. The effect of the higher 
labor participation rate and raising the age at retirement on this ratio is rather small. In 
2000, contributions still exceed benefits but the ratio becomes smaller and smaller. It is, 
however, still higher than in the benchmark scenario. In 2030 it is about 17 percent 
larger in the "65" scenario as compared to the benchmark scenario (see Table 18). In the 
"GDR scenario the ratio is somewhat lower than in the "65" scenario during the whole 
period. 
Table 18. The impact of increasing labor force participation and raising the age at 
retirement on the contribution/benefits ratio, 1985-2050. 
1985 2000 20 15 2030 2050 
Benchmark 1.06 0.94 0.70 0.58 0.59 
"GDR 1.03 0.78 0.65 0.65 
"65" 1.10 0.84 0.68 0.69 
In Finland some studies have dealt with the financing of the future pension costs. The 
study made by the Economic Planning Center (1986) states that the growth of pension 
costs will depend on economic growth. Three scenarios are used with different levels of 
growth in real income, 0.5, 1.5 and 2.5 percent growth (Figure 6). In all scenarios the 
increase of pension costs is greater than the growth of GDP up to 2015. After that it will 
be on about the same level as the growth of the GDP. In the lowest alternative, however, 
there will be greater difficulties to afford the costs as the flexibility of the economy gets 
smaller. 
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Figure 6. The proportion of pensions of the GDP, 1960-2030. Source: Economic 
Planning Center 1986. 
It is said in the study that the problems caused by the growing pension costs are not 
insurmountable, if the growth of pension costs are taken into consideration in wage 
negotiations. Further, it will be necessary to raise taxes and insurance premiums to keep 
social security on the same level as the existing legislation presumes. The share paid by 
private employers to the pension system will increase from 10.1 percent of GDP in 1987 
to 16.3 in 2030. The report also examines the effects of alternative assumptions in 
population trends, It states that an increase of total fertility per woman to 2.1 in 2010 will 
not have any positive effect on the social expenditure share of GDP, at least not during 
the period studied. Neither will a decrease of fertility to 1.4 in 2000 have any notable 
effect on the share of GDP. 
The old age pension costs are calculated to grow from 6.3 percent of the GDP per year 
in 1985 to 12.5 percent in 2030. Even if the growth of the population aged 65 and over 
will be less in the 1990s than in the beginning of the 1980s, the contribution of employers 
to pension insurance will increase more than pension costs because of the funding used 
in the pension system. As a consequence of this but also of the growing employment rate, 
the GDP ought to grow 2.4 percent annually in the 1990s, in order to keep the yearly 
growth of income of the working population at the 1.5 percent level. During the whole 
period up to 2030 the GDP ought to grow at least an average of 1.7 percent per year 
(Palm 1988, p. 58). The pension costs will grow as a consequence of an increasing 
number of beneficiaries and growing pensions, when more and more pensioners receive 
a full pension. 
8. Some Concluding Remarks 
The trend towards an aging population seem to be unavoidable and irrevocable. The 
survival curve will be "rectangularized" with more and more people living to a high age. 
At the same time fertility has decreased and seem to be close to the lowest level 
possible. To retain a young population structure seems to imply continuously growing 
fertility and also a growing population which generally is considered a goal to be avoided. 
The aging of the population faces society with questions and problems it evidently has 
never experienced earlier in history. It has been more and more necessary to plan for the 
future, to prepare demographic projections and seriously examine the trends and analyze 
the effects on all sectors of society. 
As to population development, the scenarios used in the IIASA project show that if life 
expectancy becomes longer--reaching the life expectancy observed in Switzerland--which 
might be one of the most probable features in the population development, the 
proportion of the elderly will grow rather rapidly or at least more rapidly than in the 
projection based on prevailing demographic conditions, which is also used in the official 
Finnish population projections. One of the impacts of this is not only more elderly, but 
also proportionally more men, and consequently a growing proportion of widowed men. 
With regard to the labor force, the fertility scenario shows, on the long run, that it is the 
best alternative; the labor force is much greater than in the other scenarios. Clearly, the 
low mortality scenario also shows the most rapid growth of retirees and pension 
expenditures. 
Increasing participation in the labor force by raising the labor participation rate will slow 
down the rate of decrease somewhat. If the level of labor force participation prevailing 
in the former GDR is reached in 2000, the labor force will decrease more slowly not 
among females but among males. The same will occur if the age at retirement is raised. 
The scenarios also make it clear that the pension costs will increase significantly in the 
future and, as a consequence, also the contributions. The contributions have to be 
increased tremendously in a pay-as-you-go system as the IIASA-scenarios show, but also 
in a funding system, as the Finnish studies have proved. 
The scenarios can tell us the direction and consequences of the trend but not the 
probability with which it will occur. Hence, if the results of the scenarios are to be used, 
an estimate of the probability of the trends must be made. The measures taken in order 
to avoid unwanted population development ought to be based on the most probable 
trends. However, population development is not only affected by the current population 
situation but also by economic and social development, which at the moment is rather 
rapid and includes many unknown factors, such as the integration of Europe, the ,political 
and economic development in Eastern Europe, growing environmental problems with 
global effects, etc. The scenarios give valuable information on the effects of population 
trends which--in order to give a comprehensive picture of the effects on the pension 
costs--should be completed with other things affecting these costs, such as economic 
development, funding, contribution alternatives, etc. 
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